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THE SUPREME COURT'S STILL CHANGING
ATTITUDE TOWARD CONSUMER PROTECTION
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INTEGRITY OF THE
COURT
John T. McDermott*
In the light of Sniadach, Fuentes, W. T. Grant, and North Georgia
Finishing this member of the Georgia Supreme Court still acts
largely in the dark.
Justice Gunter concurring
in Doran v. Home Mart Building
Centers, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last issue of the MONTANA LAW REVIEW, I attempted to
analyze the effect of two relatively recent Supreme Court decisions,
Fuentes v. Shevin2 and Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,3 on the existing
prejudgment attachment remedies in Montana.' I asserted that
anyone who examined the Montana statutes after Fuentes but be-
fore Mitchell would undoubtedly have concluded that both the at-
tachment' and the claim and delivery' statutes were facially uncon-
stitutional, but that after Mitchell such a conclusion was somewhat
less certain.
After the article was written, but before it was published, the
United States Supreme Court rendered a third decision7 concerning
a prejudgment attachment statute: North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc.I Alas, I cannot report that this decision resolves the
* Visiting Professor of Law, Loyola University of Los Angeles School of Law.
1. 233 Ga. 705, 213 S.E.2d 825, 828 (1975).
2. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
3. 416 U.S. 600, (1974).
4. McDermott, The Supreme Court's Changing Attitude Toward Consumer Protection
and Its Impact on Montana Prejudgment Remedies, 36 MONT. L. REv. 165 (1975).
5. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947), [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947] § 93-4301 et
seq.
6. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-4101 et seq.
7. Actually this is the fourth recent decision in the area of creditor's rights. The first,
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), involves prejudgment garnishment
of the debtor's wages said by the court to be "a specialized type of property presenting distinct
problems in our economic system." 395 U.S. at 340. Most subsequent opinions, including the
Supreme Court's most recent decision in Di-Chem, have limited the applicability of Sniadach
to wage garnishment cases. For this reason Sniadach is not included in this analysis.
8. 419 U.S. 601 (1975). The Supreme Court's decision was rendered on January 22, 1975,
but did not come to my attention in sufficient time to refer to it in the earlier article. In
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confusion and perplexity caused by the court's inconsistent deci-
sions in Fuentes and Mitchell.
II. THE IMPACT OF DI-CHEM
As pointed out in the prior article, it was uncertain as to
whether Mitchell overruled Fuentes. Justice White, the author of
Mitchell, tried valiantly to reconcile the two decisions; Justice Pow-
ell, in a concurring opinion, and Justice Stewart (the author of
Fuentes), in a dissenting opinion, agreed that Fuentes had been
overruled.' Since the composition of the court did not change be-
tween Mitchell and DiChem, as it had between Fuentes and
Mitchell, one might have assumed that the Court would use Di-
Chem as an opportunity to establish clearly that Fuentes was over-
ruled by Mitchell. Instead, Justice White, writing for the majority,
tried to use Di-Chem to reenforce his view that Fuentes was not
overruled and that Mitchell, Fuentes, and now Di-Chem can all
stand together as the law to be applied in suits challenging state
prejudgment creditor's remedies.
Even a cursory glance at the cases outlined in the appendix
should reveal why a majority of the members of the Court, numer-
ous lower courts, 0 the author, and undoubtedly a score of creditor's
attorneys concluded that Mitchell must be read as overruling
Fuentes. Admittedly there are differences between the Florida and
Pennsylvania statutes held unconstitutional in Fuentes and the
Louisiana statute upheld in Mitchell but the differences, on analy-
sis, became insignificant and, to some degree, nonexistent.
III. THE JOINT INTEREST DOCTRINE
Perhaps the most compelling argument presented in Mitchell
for upholding the Louisiana statute is the Court's emphasizing that
mitigation of my failure to do so, it seems that this decision failed to attract much attention
and was also overlooked by others. Federal National Mortgage Assoc. v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d
428 (Mo. 1975) was decided almost two months after Di-Chem but the Supreme Court of
Missouri overlooked this important decision until. it was brought to its attention in a petition
for rehearing. 521 S.W.2d at 439.
9. Justices Douglas and Marshall joined in Justice Stewart's opinion and Justice Bren-
nan, also dissenting, agreed that Fuentes required reversal of the lower court judgment in
Mitchell. Thus a majority of the Court seemed to agree that Mitchell overruled Fuentes.
10. One federal district court went so far as to overrule an earlier three judge district
court opinion, Gunter v. Merchants Warren National Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Maine
1973), holding unconstitutional the Maine law permitting the prejudgment attachment of real
estate without prior notice and hearing. In re the Oranoka, 393 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Maine 1975),
Judge Gignoux, a frequently mentioned candidate for one of the recent vacancies on the
Supreme Court, concluded that Mitchell and the summary affirmance by the Supreme Court
of a three judge district court in Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997 (D.
Ariz. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 901 (1974) "have significantly vitiated the scope of Fuentes and
cast substantial doubt on the continued vitality of Gunter..." 393 F. Supp. at 1313.
[Vol. 37
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both the creditor and the debtor have a property right, or at least a
joint interest, in the property subject to the seizure or attachment:
the creditor has a vendor's lien based on an installment sales con-
tract, while the debtor has a right to possession under the same
agreement.
Plainly enough, this is not a case where the property sequestered
by the Court is exclusively the property of the defendant debtor.
The question is not whether a debtor's property may be seized by
his creditors, pendente lite, where they hold no present interest in
the property sought to be seized. The reality is that both seller and
buyer had current, real interests in the property, and the definition
of property rights is a matter of state law. Resolution of the due
process question must take account not only of the interests of the
buyer of the property but those of the seller as well."
The existence of joint interests persuaded the majority that the
Louisiana statute, by requiring the creditor to put up a bond to
protect the debtor from damages or expenses resulting from an im-
provident attachment, and by permitting the debtor to regain pos-
session by putting up his own bond to protect the seller or, absent
the bond, to demand an immediate hearing, provided "a constitu-
tional accommodation of the conflicting interests of the parties.' 2
As the Court indicated, the continued possession by the debtor
during the litigation of the controversy would impair the creditor's
rights in the property, either by diminution in value resulting from
normal use, or, at the extreme, by the destruction or transfer of the
property by the debtor. In the Court's view, the statute succeeds in
protecting the rights of both the creditor and the debtor. It insures
the creditor will be able to protect his interests by seizing the prop-
erty, while the debtor will be protected by the creditor's bond. Alter-
natively, the debtor can retain possession and use of the property
by posting a bond which will serve to protect the creditor.
Unfortunately the joint property interests, stressed so emphati-
cally in Mitchell, cannot be used to distinguish. Mitchell from
Fuentes because both the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes
stricken in Fuentes involved prejudgment attachment of property in
which the creditor retained significant property rights under condi-
tional or installment sales contracts valid under applicable state
law.
Apparently overlooking this distinction, some courts have
treated the attachment of the creditor's interest to the property as
a crucial factor in determining the constitutionality of a state stat-
ute which permits a prejudgment seizure or attachment without
11. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., supra note 3 at 1898.
12. Id. at 1900.
1976]
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prior notice and hearing. Thus, both a federal district court and the
state supreme court held the Michigan prejudgment garnishment
statute unconstitutional partly because the property seized under
the Michigan statute was "most unlike that before the Court in
Mitchell where both debtor and creditor had current, real interests
in the sequestered property."' 3 This approach seems consistent with
the facts of Di-Chem, since the Georgia statute declared unconstitu-
tional was utilized to garnish a bank account in which the creditor
had no interest or property right. But Justice White was apparently
unwilling to base the decision in Di-Chem on this very important
difference, for in so doing, he would have had to concede what he
has consistently attempted to deny: Mitchell overruled Fuentes. As
a result, the Court's opinion in Di- Chem has convinced other courts
that the existence of a property right in the merchandise or property
being seized is not significant in determining the constitutionality
of an attachment or garnishment statute.'4
To uphold the Louisiana statute in Mitchell, while not overrul-
ing Fuentes, Justice White had to find some other grounds for dis-
tinguishing the statutes involved. He found three. First, he noted
the content of the affidavits required under the state laws of Florida,
Pennsylvania and Louisiana was somewhat different. The Florida
and Pennsylvania statutes did not require a detailed statement of
the basis for the plaintiff creditor's claim, while the Louisiana stat-
ute did. Second, the Louisiana statute was applicable in Orleans
Parish but not throughout the state. It required the judge, rather
than the clerk of the court, to issue a writ of attachment. Finally,
the Louisiana statute permitted the debtor to seek an immediate
hearing at which he could challenge the basis for the attachment.
IV. JUDICIAL SUPERVISION
While the Louisiana statute seems to require more detailed and
specific allegations in the petition seeking the writ of garnishment
or attachment than do either the Florida or Pennsylvania statutes,
and that a judge rather than a court clerk is the official empowered
by statute to issue the writ, when analyzed neither factor supports
the conclusion that the Louisiana statute affords due process while
the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes do not. Justice White seems
to overlook the most important aspect of the decision-making pro-
13. Douglas Research & Chemical Inc., v. Soloman, 388 F. Supp. 433, 436 (E. D. Mich.
1975); Cf. Cochrane v. Westwood Wholesale Grocery Co., 394 Mich. 164, 229 N.W.2d 309
(1975).
14. Hutchinson v. Bank of North Carolina, 392 F. Supp. 888, 898 (M.D. N. Car. 1975);
Doran v. Home Mart Bldg. Centers, Inc., supra note 1 at 828 (concurring opinion of Gunter,
[Vol. 37
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cess employed under all three statutes: the decision to issue the writ
is made ex parte based only on affidavits submitted by the
creditors.' 4.' Whether the affidavit requirements are simple or com-
plex and whether the decision is made by a judicial officer or a
ministerial official has little significance when the decision is made
by a person who only hears one side of the story. The availability of
"forms" for affidavits that satisfy the Louisiana requirements per-
suaded Justice Stewart that:
the Louisiana affidavit requirement can be met by any plaintiff
who fills in the blanks on the appropriate form documents and
presents the completed forms to the court. Although the standard-
ized form in this case calls for somewhat more information than
that required by the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes challenged
in Fuentes, such ex parte allegations "are hardly a substitute for
a prior hearing, for they test no more than the strength of the
applicants own belief in his rights."'"
Thus the person who issues the writ, be he judge or clerk, is simply
performing a ministerial task; if the affidavit satisfies the statutory
requirements, and the required bond is posted, the official appar-
ently has no choice and must issue the writ of attachment.
Furthermore, the contents of the affidavit emphasized in
Mitchell lose their significance in Di-Chem. The Georgia statute
required the plaintiff to state not only the amount claimed to be due
but also "that he has reason to apprehend the loss of the same or
some part thereof unless process of garnishment shall issue."' 6 In
compliance with the requirements of this statute, the president of
Di-Chem, Incorporated, signed and submitted his affidavit stating:
that North Georgia Finishing, Inc., defendant, is indebted to said
plaintiff (Di-Chem, Inc.) in the sum of $51,279.17 DOLLARS...
and that affiant has reason to apprehend the loss of said sum or
some part thereof unless process of garnishment issues."
The affidavit in Mitchell established an unpaid and overdue bal-
ance of $574.17 and that the plaintiff believed the defendant would:
14.1. The California Supreme Court has recently pointed out some of the inherent
defects in ex parte proceedings:
The first is a shortage of factual and legal contentions. Not only are facts and law
from the defendant lacking, but the moving party's own presentation is often abbre-
viated because no challenge from the defendant is anticipated at this point in the
proceeding.
United Farm Workers v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz City, - Cal. 3d -, 537 P.2d 1237,
1241, 122 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1975).
15. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., supra note 3 at 1912.
16. GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED, § 46-102, cited in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-
Chem Inc., supra note 8 at 602.
17. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., supra note 8 at 604.
1976]
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encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of the merchandise . . .
during the pendency of these proceedings, and that a writ of se-
questration is necessary in the premises.Is
Although there are slight differences between the language of the
Louisiana and Georgia statutes and between the affidavits actually
filed in the two cases, the differences are clearly too insignificant to
serve as standards for determining the constitutionality of similar
state statutes.
There is one factual difference which might be a basis for recon-
ciling these three decisions. The three state statutes found unconsti-
tutional in Fuentes and Di- Chem permitted a clerk or prothonotary
to issue the writ while the Louisiana statute upheld in Mitchell, as
it applies in Orleans Parish, 9 requires the writ to be issued by a
judge. It is doubtful this fact will be controlling in the future. As
one court has recently pointed out, "there are suggestions in the
concurring and dissenting opinions [in Di-Chem] that some jus-
tices do not believe that supervision of the ex parte proceedings by
a judicial officer is required."20 Additionally, one three-judge dis-
trict court has determined the court clerk can, for the purpose of
satisfying Mitchell, be treated as a judicial officer.2' Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has held a court clerk in Florida is a "judicial
officer" and therefore can issue arrest warrants.22 Unfortunately for
Justice White, it was also a court clerk in Florida who issued the
writ in Fuentes, thus making it impossible to distinguish Fuentes
and Mitchell on the basis that to be valid the writ must be issued
by a "judicial officer."
V. THE IMMEDIATE POST SEIZURE HEARING
Only one basis exists for trying to distinguish Di-Chem from
Mitchell and Mitchell from Fuentes. In Mitchell the Court empha-
sized that the Louisiana statute permitted an immediate hearing,
on motion of the debtor, to determine whether there was in fact a
basis for the attachment or seizure of the debtor's property. In Di-
Chem, the Court noted there was no similar provision for a hearing,
and this alone has been the basis for determining a statute's consti-
tutionality.23 While it was unclear that the Florida procedure under
18. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., supra note 3 at 1897.
19. Since the Louisiana statute permits a clerk to issue the writ throughout the rest of
the state, the statute must be unconstitutional in every parish in Louisiana except Orleans
Parish where, ironically, the Mitchell case arose.
20. Guzman v. Western State Bank, 516 F.2d 125, 131 n. 7 (8th Cir. 1975).
21. Hutchinson v. Bank of North Carolina, supra note 14 at 896.
22. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 351 (1972).
23. For example, the North Carolina statute was upheld primarily because it provides
for an immediate post-seizure hearing. Hutchinson v. Bank of North Carolina, supra note 21
[Vol. 37
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attack in Fuentes permitted an immediate post-seizure hearing"4 it
appears that a debtor in Pennsylvania can, by motion, seek to va-
cate the attachment order at any time, thereby giving him the same
right to an immediate hearing that the debtor has in Mitchell. But,
more important than a comparison of the nature or timing of the
post-seizure hearings involved in these three cases, is the fact that
the majority in Fuentes in no uncertain terms emphasized that any
type of post-seizure hearing would, on constitutional grounds, be
totally inadequate to preserve the constitutionality of a statute15
which deprived a person of his property without prior notice and
hearing. The Court stated:
The Florida replevin process guarantees an opportunity for a hear-
ing after the seizure of goods, and the Pennsylvania process allows
a post-seizure hearing if the aggrieved party shoulders the burden
of initiating one. But neither the Florida nor Pennsylvania statute
provides notice or an opportunity to be heard before the seizure."8
The Court in Fuentes emphasized that, to satisfy due process, the
right to notice and hearing "must be granted at a time when the
deprivation can still be prevented.' 2 Clearly then, the availability
of an immediate post-seizure hearing cannot serve as the basis for
reconciling Fuentes and Mitchell, since the Fuentes Court consid-
ered that factor irrelevant.
What then are the real differences between the Florida, Penn-
sylvania, Louisiana and Georgia statutes? The differences are ap-
parently intentionally obscured:
One gains the impression, particularly from the final paragraph of
its opinion, that the Court is endeavoring to say as little as possible
in explaining just why the Supreme Court of Georgia is being re-
versed.21
at 897. A North Dakota statute was stricken down because an immediate post-seizure hearing
was only available if the debtor posted a bond. Guzman v. Western State Bank, supra note
20 at 131.
24. It seems that in Florida the debtor must await the trial of the underlying contro-
versy to attack the attachment.
25. The requirement for a preseizure hearing may be relaxed where a strong government
interest is involved such as the protection of the public from contaminated food or mis-
branded drugs and to "safeguard the integrity of the public purse." Harverhill Manor, Inc.
v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 330 N.E.2d 180, 188 (Mass. 1975); Cf. Dupuy v. Superior
Court, 123 Cal. Rptr. 273, 538 P.2d 729 (1975).
26. Fuentes v. Shevin, supra note 2 at 80.
27. Id. at 81.
28. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., supra note 8 at 64 (dissenting
opinion of Justice Blackmun).
1976]
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VI. THE VAGUE AND HAZY GUIDELINES OF STARE DECISIS25
To understand the real cause of this perplexing state of affairs
one must look beyond the statutes involved to other factors. It was
Mr. Justice Stewart, the author of Fuentes, who pointed out that
the difference between Fuentes and Mitchell was the composition
of the Court which decided the cases.30
He also expressed grave concern over the impact that these two
inconsistent decisions would have on the nation's respect for the
Court.
A basic change in the law on a ground no firmer than a change in
our membership invites the popular misconception that this insti-
tution is little different from the two political branches of the
Government. No misconception could do more lasting injury to
this court and to the system of law which it is our abiding mission
to serve. 3'
As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has pointed out:
"Certainly constitutional interpretation must respond to social
change but this duty does not explain speedy overruling of new
doctrines. "32
As Justice Stewart chides the Court for its fickleness in
Mitchell, Justice Blackmun criticizes the Court for its inconsistent
behavior in all three cases. He attributes the vacillation to the fact
that Fuentes was decided by the Court while it was not at full
strength.33
The admonition of the great Chief Justice [that the Court, except
in cases of "absolute necessity", should not decide a constitutional
question unless there is a majority of the whole court." Briscoe v.
29. State judges like Justice Gunter (supra p. 1) are not the only ones confused by these
cases. One federal judge has recently commented: "A review of the cases ...makes clear
that the guidelines of stare decisis have long since grown hazy and vague." Jonnet v. Dollar
Savings Bank, 392 F. Supp. 1385, 1387 (W. D. Penna 1975). This may explain, in part, the
unusual situation now existing in Pennsylvania. On February 12, 1975, Judge Bechtle sitting
in Philadelphia upheld the Pennsylvania foreign attachment procedures. Simkins Industries
Inc. v. Fuld & Co., 392 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Less than two months later Judge
Teitelbaum, sitting in Pittsburgh, found those procedures unconstitutional. 392 F. Supp. at
1393.
30. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., supra note 3 at 1914.
31. Id. Justice Stewart does not improve the Court's image by paraphrasing Samuel
Clemens in referring to the impact of Di-Chem on Fuentes:
It is gratifying to note that my report of the demise of Fuentes v. Shevin . . . [in
his dissenting opinion in Mitchell] seems to have been greatly exaggerated.
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., supra note 8 at 723.
32. McIntyre v. Associates Financial Services Company of Mass., Inc., 328 N.E.2d 492,
494 n.2 (1975).
33. Fuentes was argued on November 9, 1971 and decided on June 12, 1972. Mr. Justice
Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined the court on January 7, 1972 after the case had been
argued but before the decision was announced.
[Vol. 37
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Bank of Kentucky, 8 Pet. 118, 122 (1834)], in my view, should
override any natural, and perhaps understandable, eagerness to
decide. Had we bowed to that wisdom when Fuentes was before us,
and waited a brief time for reargument before a full court, what-
ever its decision might have been, I venture to suggest that we
would not be immersed in confusion, with Fuentes one way,
Mitchell another, and now this case decided in a manner that
leaves counsel in the commercial communities and other states
uncertain as to whether their own established and long accepted
statutes pass constitutional muster with the waivering tribunal off
in Washington D. C. This court surely fails in its intended purpose
when confusing results of this kind are forthcoming and are im-
posed upon those who owe and those who lend."
Justice Blackmun's concerns about the effect and confusion
created by constitutional interpretations supported by less than a
majority of the full court should not be limited to situations where
the court was undermanned but should be considered whenever
there is no majority opinion." Perhaps the Court's most egregious
decision occurred in National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater
Transfer Co., Inc. ," in which the Court decided the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland had jurisdiction over a
suit between a citizen of Virginia and a citizen of the District of
Columbia, in spite of a determination by a strong majority of the
Court that the District of Columbia was not a state within the
meaning of Article II[ of the Constitution and that a federal district
court could not exercise jurisdiction over suits that were not be-
tween citizens of different states. As a result, this perplexing case
stands for the proposition that, although a federal district court can
exercise jurisdiction over suits between a citizen of the District of
Columbia and a citizen of one of the several states, it cannot do so
under either of the theories advanced to support such jurisdiction."
34. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., supra note 8 at 618-619.
35. The Arizona Supreme Court carried this concern to the extreme of refusing to
declare a state prejudgment garnishment statute unconstitutional on grounds established in
Fuentes v. Shevin, supra note 2, because the United States Supreme Court hearing that case
was not a full court. The Arizona court noted that when "we have doubts that once the full
court hears the case that the opinion will stand, we are reluctant to declare unconstitutional
Arizona statutes based upon a decision by less than a clear majority." Roofing Wholesale Co.,
Inc. v. Palmer, 502 P.2d 1327, (1972).
36. 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
37. Three justices (Jackson, Black & Burton) were of the opinion that the District of
Columbia was not a "state" as that term is used in Article M but that federal court jurisdic-
tion over such suits could be found in Article I; two justices (Rutledge and Murphy) were of
the opinion that the District of Columbia was a "state" but "strongly dissented" from the
idea that constitutional courts could exercise Article I jurisdiction; the remainder of the court
(Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Douglas, Frankfurter and Reed) agreed that neither Article
I nor Article III could support jurisdiction over the case at bar.
1976]
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Justice Blackmun may have been correct in suggesting this
confusion and uncertaintly could have been avoided by ordering
reargument of Fuentes after Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined
the court. But it is possible a Tidewater situation still could have
developed and the present confusion and perplexity would not have
been avoided.
The real problem seems to emerge from a careful reading of
Justice White's opinions in all three cases. It is clear from his dis-
senting opinion in Fuentes3 8 that he disagreed with the holding of
the Court. Mitchell gave him an opportunity to repudiate the hold-
ing in Fuentes and establish as "the law" in this area his dissenting
opinion in Fuentes. But he and several other members of the Court,
perhaps chided by Justice Stewart's remarks, were unwilling to ig-
nore the doctrine of stare decisis and overrule the very recent
Fuentes decision. So in Di-Chem he tried once again to show that
Mitchell does not overrule Fuentes, thereby paying homage to the
doctrine of stare decisis. Torn between his view as to the correct
decision in this area of the law and his duty to uphold the Court as
an institution by applying the doctrine of stare decisis, Justice
White tried to accomodate both. It is the opinion of at least two of
his colleagues that in so doing, Justice White did a disservice to the
Court and to the public.
VII. CONCLUSION
The blame for this unfortunate situation lies on neither Justice
White nor the four justices who formed the majority in Fuentes. The
real fault lies in the Court's failure to heed Chief Justice Marshall's
admonition and the Court's resultant misuse of the doctrine of stare
decisis. Of course Justice Stewart is correct in suggesting that recent
decisions of the Court should be followed by it as well as by lower
courts, but he misses the point. A decision not supported by five or
more justices may decide the case before the Court but is not a
"decision of the Court" and should not be given stare decisis recog-
nition.
However, Justice Blackmun was wrong in suggesting that the
Court should have postponed its decision in Fuentes to await its new
members. The decisional process should have continued in its nor-
mal course, but, when the Court reached its decision and found it
was not supported by five or more justices, it should have an-
nounced its decision 39 but filed no opinion "for the Court." Individ-
38. Fuentes v. Shevin, supra note 2 at 97-103.
39. As it does when the Court is evenly split ("the judgment below is affirmed by an
equally divided court."), the Court should announce: "the judgment below is affirmed (or
reversed) by a divided court."
[Vol. 37
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ual justices could, of course, file concurring or dissenting opinions,
but they would be considered merely the personal views of individ-
ual members of the Court, not in themselves precedents.
Then, Justice White would have found no dilemma in Mitchell.
If four of his colleagues had supported the views he expressed in
Fuentes, those views would have become "the law" and the present
confusion would never have existed. The doctrine of stare decisis,
when properly employed, provides "an element of continuity in the
law" and "the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expecta-
tions."' 0 Its strained and unnecessary application in these cases does
neither.
40. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1939).
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